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Summary  findings
The remarkable  surge in private  capital flows to  portfolios  of OECD  investors.  In the 1970s,  commercial
developing  countries  since 1990 has  greatly  facilitated  bank loans accounted  for proportionately  more flows.
their rapid growth, at a time when OECD  countries have  Now, inceasingly large roles are played by bondholders,
been in, or passed through, recession.  The importance  of  equity  investors,  and money market  fund-.
these flows  to the current account of several  large  A prolonged  major increase  in international  interest
developing  countries has  caused  concern about their  rates  would jeopardize  continuation  of the flows  at
susrainabiliry,  especially  if international  interesr  rates  current levels,  but the likelihood  of such an increase  in
continue rising.  the next three to five  years is slim.  Any  rise in interest
The form of these flows,  and their source -investors  rates in industrial  countries  will largely  reflect  rising
rather than commcrcial  banks  - causes  concern  about  demand for credit because  of increased  economic
their short-term  volatility.  To address  the issue of  activity,  whtch  vwll  benefit developing  country exports.
sustainability,  Dadush, Dhareshwar,  and Johannes draw  Commodity  prices have  surged in the past six months,
on analyses  of international  financial  flows and economic  but measures  of core inflation,  induding unit labor costs,
prospects  caried  out by the Bank's  Internatonal  are at a historic  low. This  scenario  is very  different  from
Economics  Department.  They conclude  that private  the combination  of high  interest rates and economic
capital flows to developing  countrics  are likely  to be  recession  the developing  world faced  in the early 1980s,
sustained  at, or near, current total levels  for the  as high ani rising inflation  induced sudden tightening  of
following  reasons:  monetary  policies.
Much of the private flow comes  from direct  Still, significant  areas of risk deserve  attention from.
investment.  Foreign direct investment  has increased  as  developing  country  governments,  international  financial
international  businesses  pursue globalization  strategies.  insatunons, and industrial  country  investors.  Some  major
Firms  are taking  advantage  of liberalization  drives and  recipients  of private capital flows  are vulnerable  to
rising  incomes  in developing  countries,  as well as  sudden changes  in both domestic  or extenal
dramatic changes in transporr and relecommunications  envirorunents. And portfolio  equity flows are likely to be
- factors that are structnual rather than cyclical, and that  more volatile than other forms of private capital flows.
are bkeLy  to be reinforced  by implementation  of Uruguay  The policy  response  to large capital inflows  should
Round agreements.  depend on whether the current account deficit  is
* Sources  of finance  are more  diversified.  There is  sustainable  and the degree  to which it is over- or under-
greater  risk-sharing  between  creditor and debtor. Funds  financed.  While  the external environment  is favorable,
are predominantly  going  to the privatc  sector (not  vulnerable  countries have a window of opporunity to
sovereign  govermnents).  And developing  countries still  undermke  adjustment.
account  for less  than 1 percent of the investment
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The recent  big story  in developing  country  financing  has  been  the spectacular  surge  in private  capital  i  -n
the 90s. Is itthe case,  as some  haveworried,  that abiggerstory'waitingaround  the comeris  an equally
spectular  reversal  in these  flows,  leading  to another  financial  crisis  of the  type  that  foUowed  the  last  big
surge  in private  financing  for  the developing  countries  in the 1970s?  A genealized  reversal  inprvate
flows  is unlikely,  because  in lare part  they  reflect  structural  changes,  both  in  the  international  capital  mares
and in  devloping  countrs. Individual  countries,  however,  are  likely  to experiience  volatility  in financial
flows  and changing  terms  of access  to capital  markets.ARE PlRIVATE  CAPITAL  FLOWS  TO DEVELOPING  COUNTRIES
SUSTAINABLE?.
The  big recent  story  in developing  country  financing  has been  the spectacular
surge  in private  capital  - trebling  in the  last four years  to over  $115  bn. in 1993.
Some  analysts  wony that a bigger  story  waiting  around  the  comer  is an equally
spectacular  reversal  in these  flows,  leading  to another  filancial cnsis of the  type  that
followed  the last big surge  i  private  financing  for the developing  counties  in the
1970s.
Our  analysis  suggests,  however,  that a generalized  r  sal in capital  flows  is
un-likely  for the following  four  reasons:
Over half  the flows  are accounted  for by foreign direct investment The
acceleration  in FDI  is driven  by the  ified  pursuit  of worldwide  production,
sourcing,  and  marketing  strategies  by i  Onal  businesses. These  firms  are
responding  to the  market  potential  offered  by rising  developing  country  m'comes, to
more  welcoming  trade  and  mvestment  regimes  mi  these countries  and  to drmatic
changes  in telecomun ications  technology.  These  factors  are structural  not cyclical,
and are  likely  to be reinforced  by implemeon  of provisions  of the  Urgay  W
Round.
Debt, as opposed  to equity,  still  accounts  for 40 percent of all international  private
flows,  but unlike  the generalized  commercial  bank loans of the 1970s,  this is
mainly  in the form of bond  issues  by about 20 of the more creditworthy  developing
countries. Bonds  are  not inherently  more stable  than bank  loans,  but the
creditworthiness  requirements  for  issuing  bonds  in the major  ficial  centers  reduce
the  risks  of subsequent  default Underlying  this  renewed  access  is the  fundamental
reform  in economic  and  financial  policies  these countries  have  undertaken  over  the
1980s.
Despite  the recent  surge, developing  countries  still-account  for a
disproportionately small share of the portfolios of OECD investors.  Less ta  one
percent  of pension  fand  holdings  are  invested  in emerging  marlcets,  even  though  they
account  for a six  percent  share  of world  stock  maret  capitlizan,  and  developing
counties are expected  to account  for over  one-third  of the growth  in world  trade  and
output  in the next 10  years. Furtiermore,  the  proliferation  of mutual  fund  vehicles  is
I  This  nOt ha beprepared  by s  ui  the  Devdapmet Economics  Vce Psiq.  Additiaonl  dmateialn  be
found  in a papr of  the same  title  by  U. Dadush,  A.  Dhareshwar,  P. Johannes  oftbe  ioralEcowmic
DepaWML Vcuy  useful  suggens  and  commmnts  by  M Ahmed,  l Baird,  A.  Bhattucarya  S. Clamezs,  P. Da
Cunha,  M Dooley.  and U YKiguel  ac  gatefiUy acinowledged.enabling  private  irnd  o  vest  in emerging  market  directly  at moderate  costs.
Many studies  have  shown  ta  OECD  invstors can  get diversification  gains  from
investing  in emergng  markets,  since  their  correlaion with  stock  markets  in i  al
counties is relatively  low..'
A-large and prolonged  increase in interational  interest  rates would  jeopardize-
continued  growth  in these flows,  but the probability of such an increase  is small  ii
the next  three to five  years, Despite  recent  concems  on ovedeating  in the  US
economy,  the consensusis  sti  ta  -an  increase  in real  interest  rates over  the medium
teim  will be modest  since inflat  y pressures  are muted.  The  rise  in intere rates
will largely  reflect sing credit  demand  resulting  from.  higher  economic  activity  whici
wil bexefit  the exports  of  deveoping  ountries. In  the  medium  , m  try
policies  in the  G-3  seem  set on a prdent course,  and  budget  deficits  in the  dstial
countries  are expected  to decline  modestly  as a perc  e of GDP.  odity
prices, inclding oi, are  expected  to  recover  only gradually  fm  histoc lows. This
is a very  different  scenario  from he hike  in interest  rates  and economic  recession
combination  tbat  hit the'developing  world  in 1980-82,  as high  and  nrsing  inflation
induced  monetaiy  policies  to'tighten  suddenly.
There  are two  important caveats to this overall  positive  outlook.
Firstj  even  with  growing  overall  private capital flOWs,  individual  countries
are likely  to find that volatility  and changing  terms  of access  to capital markets
are very real probIems. Pvate investors  respond  with  alacrity  to a wor  g of
economic  prospects  or to the  threat  of  politidcal  instiliy  (eg. a reputed  $10  bn.  has
flown  out  of Meico-in the  past  month).
Take  the 18  counties  which,  between  them,  account  for over  80 percent  of
these  inflos.  Among  them,  vulneability,  as measured  by a wide  range  of indicators,
varies  considerably.  For example,  based  on the  trend  of the last five  years,  free of
these couuties-Argmtina, India,  and  Mexico 2-have  acclated  foreiga  lia  ies a
a rate  wbich  grealy exceeds  the  growth  of their  exports.  These  cutries,  which.
accoumt  for 23 percent  of private  inflows  to developing  counies, will probably  need-
to engineer  a soft  landing  of their current  account  deficit  in the  not  too distant  fiutre,
or at least  to  show a sten  nrnressinn  mi exnnrm  that would  enalhe  them  tn csrmiTwo otier countries,  Turkey  and Venezuela,  which together  account  for 6
percent  of flows,  have  seen  a marked  deterioration  in economic  performance  in the
last two  years on account  largely  of domestic  policies. High fiscal  deficits,
appreciation  of the  real exchange  rate, and deteriorating  current  account  positions,
have combined  to force  a retrenchment  in denand and a deceleration  in output
Venezuela  is, in addition,  suffering  from the sharp  fall in oil prices  in the last  year.
Second,  portfolio  equity, which accounts  for only 10 percent of all private
flows but gets the lion's share of media coverage, is likely to display more
volatility both across countries and in the aggregate.  Although the fimdamental
reasons for investing  in emerging markets are sound, ny  analysts believe that
periods of extraordinary  appreciation have induced a herd instinct amongst investors-
one that holds within it the seeds of subsequent disillusion. Some coretion  has
already  t!z:n place  in recent  months,  but a few emerging  markets  remain  overbought
Recent  P/E ratios  in Argentia, Columbia,  India,  Hungary  and  Poland  wee more han-
double  the average  for US and European  markets. More  generally,  emerging  markets
suffer  from limited  liquidity  and poor regulation  and infirastructure.  A crisis  in one
market  or the other  may well develop  as these  markets  mature;  but the important  thing
is to keep  this problem  in perspective  in looking  at overall  developing  counlty
financing.
A policy response is needed in some cases.
Govenments  cannot  anticipate  some  adverse  developments  - such  as those  in
Mexico,  but they  can take steps to reduce their  vulnerability  to sudden  reversals  in
market  sentimcnt Even  among  vulnerable  countries,  sitaations  differ  greatly  and
policies  have to be specifically  tailored. Steps  to consider  are:
*  Reducing  large  budget  deficits  and  high real interest  rates where  they are  the
factors  primarily  responsible  for inducing  the inflows.
*  Strenening  the  institutional  and  regulatory  framework  of capital  markets  and the
banking  sector,  building  firewalls  as needed  to stiengthen  the solvency  and
liquidity  of the  banldng  system  in the face of unanticipated  large external  shocks.
*  Ensuring  that  the policy  and incentives  structure  encourages  the use of capital
(domestic  and  extemal)  to support  investment,  and  the growth  of exports  that  will
provide  the basis  for sustained  creditworthiness.  This  requires  an open  trade
regime,  eliminatng  regulations  and unnecessary  tax or bureaucratic  burdens  to
exports,  and avoiding  overvalued  exchange  rates.Restrcting  capital  inflow  is unlikely  to be an effective  long-tenm  measure,  but may
serve  at imes to forestall  speculative  inflows. Opening  up opportunities  for
r  residents  to invest  abroad  also helps  to buy the benefits  of asset  diversification
while  relieving  pressure  on the exchange  rate.
The  curent international  economic  environment  is more  favorable  hn  it has
been for 20 years. World output, weighted 'by  the share of developing  country
exports,  is grownng  at close  to 3% a year, and  interest  rates, inflation  and oil  prices  are
at near  historic  lows. This  provides  a window  of opyortunity  for countries  to adjust
their  domestic  imbalances  and achieve  a soft  landire. Policy  measures  to achieve  tis
are  likely  to be much  less  disruptive  while  the counties have  the confidence  of
intemational  investors,  and  the extemal  environment  is faivorable,  tha  when  a crnsis  is
at hand.(~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
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ARE  PRIVATE  CAPITAL  FLOWS  TO  DEVELOPING  COUNTRIES
SUSTAINABLE?"
U. Dadush,  A. Dhareshwar,  R. Johanes
Intrnational  Economics  Department
L  INTRODUCTION
Private  capital  ilows  to developing  counties have  quadrupled  in the last three years to
reach more than $157 billion in 1993.2 Although  the projections for 1994 are that they will
stabilize  at near  the 1993  level,  the size  of the flows,  expressed  in real terms,  now exceeds  the
levels precedi  the debt crisis by a wide margin.  In contrast-to  the  1970's, when the
dominant  source  of private capital  inflow  was commercial  bank lending,  they have largely
taken  the form  of bonds  and foreign  direct  investment  (see  Table 1 later  in the text). Portfolio
equity,  which  had been  a small  and growing  component  in the early 1990s,  rose spectularly
in 1993 to reach  $47 bullion  For the most part, the portfolio  flows  have been directed  to
some  20 middle-income  countries  in Latin  America  and  East Asia, and  to China.
The  continuation  of private  capital  flows  at or near current  levels  conditions  the current
sanguine  assessment  of developing  country  prospects.  The importance  of the flows in
financing  the current  account  of several  large developing  countres has raised concerns  about
iheir  sustainability,  especialy  if intnational  terest  rates  conte  to nse.  The form  of these
new flows, and their source-investors rather than commercial  banks-has  led to  questions
about their volatlity in the short term.  The size, autonomous  nature, and suddenness of the
inflows have created prowlems  of macroeconomic  management in some counties,  especially
potendal  overvaluation  of the real exchange  rate.  In a world  economy  that is becoming  more
tightly-knit every year,  the appropriate response of policies to  the new phenomenon is a
question  for countries at all stages of development.
This note addresses  the issue of sustainability  directly  by drawing  together  disparate
strands of  research.  Among these are  the  analyses of  international financial flows  and
economic  prospects carried out in the Inteonal  Economics  Department  of the World Bank.
The  issue of  sustainability is  distinct from,  though related to,  the  macroeconomic and
Vey usefl suggesons  and  commnt  by  M.  Abmed,  M. Baird,  A.  haitara  S. Claessens,  P. Da
COuna,  M. Dooley,  M.  Kiguel,  and  R.  Zagba  are  lly  acknowledg  wifiout  implicating  them.
2  Preminilumy  figures-currenl being  revised. Source:  World  Bank.  World  Debt  Tables,  1994  (draft).
- . - ~~~~~~~~~1microeconomic  management  of the capital  inflows  by developing  countries;  hence,  findings  on
the  latter issue are  only touched upon where it  is  felt to  be  directly relevant to  the
sustainability  question.
The question  of sustainability  does not easily lend itself to generalization  because  the
prospects  for sustainability  vary enormously  by country, and considerably  by type of capital
flow. Changes  in the international  economic  environment,  at first sight a common  factor, also
affect countries  and types of flow very differently. The opinions  expressed  in this note are
qualified  accordingly.
Much of the discussion  of causes  of private  capital  flows to developing  countries  has
focused  on the relative  importance  of extemral  and domestic  factors.  These  are referred  to as
"push" factors (e g., lower international  interest  rates in industralized  countries,  institutional
and regulatory  changes  in industrial  countries)  and "pull" factors (e.g., improved  developing
country  creditworthiness,  liberalized  codes  of inward  direct investment). If the latter are most
important, then developing  countries  that perform well can be assured contnued financing
even if the international economic  environment deteriorates.  If, on the other hand, the "push"
factors  dominate,  then recipients  of the flows are at the mercy of the elements,  so to speak.
Some  observers  have in fact argued  that push elements  are the prime drivers  of private capitl-
flows  to developing  countries; others  that push and pull have  both  been important.
The view taken here is that while historically  low interational interest rates are an
important  precipitaing factor behind the increased  flows, other equally important  "push"
factors  have been at work which reflect sructural changes  in imdustrial  countries,  unlikely  to
reverse  quickly. In addition,  "pull" factors  such as policies  of trade reform,  privatiaion  and
liberalization  in developing  countries  have been a vital ingredient. Recently,  it has become
better  appreciat  that "pull" and "push" factors  are in fact interdependent.  For example,  low
internaional  interest  rates  have  enabled  developing  countries  to pay a large premium  to investors
seeking  to eam yields  prevalent  in the industrial  counties in the 1980s.- But they are also a
prime  cause  of lower  debt  service  ratios  and improved  creditworthiness  of developing  counties.
LT.  SUMMARY  OUTLEM
A.  Our main conclusion is that  while private flows  to developing countries will not
continue to grow at rates seen mi recent years, a generalzeed  reversal in capital  flows is
unlely  for the folowing three  reasons:
A.I.  A large proportion (over 40 peent)  of the private flows are  accounted for by
foreign direct investment.  The acceleration  in FDI is driven by the intensified  pursuit of
worldwide  production,  sourcing,  and marketing  strategies  by international  businesses. These
firms are responding  to the market  potential  offered  by rising developing  country  incomes,  to
3~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Femnandez-Arias,  Eduardo,  1994.  "The New Wave of Private Capital Flows,"  mimeo,  in process for
working paper series.
.2more welcoming trade and investment regimes in these countries and to dramatic changes in
telecommunications  technology and transportation costs.  These factors are largely structural,
not cyclical, and are likely to be reinforced by implementation  of provisions of the Uruguay
Round.
A.2.  The sources  of  finance are much  more diversified, there is  greater risk sharing
between creditor and debtor, the private sector is increasingly  important  as recipient,.  and
developing  countries still account for a disproportionately  small share of the portfolios of
OECD  investors.  Commercial banks have  been  supplemented by  bondholders,  equity
investors, and money market funds.  Within private flows, equity now predominates over
debt,  and  borrowers  are  predominantly private  sector.  Portfolio  equity  investment in
developing countries accounts for  an estmted  less than one percent of OECD investment
portfolios.
A.3.  A large  and  prolonged  increase  in  international  interest  rates  would jeopardize
continuation  of these flows at current  levels, but the  probability of such an increase is
small in  the next  three  to  five years.  Despite recent concerns on overheating in the US
economy, the consensus  is still that an increase in real interest rates over the medium tern  will
be modest since inflationary pressures are muted.  The rise in interest rates will largely reflect
rising credit demand resulting from higher economic activity which will benefit the exports of
developing  countries.  In the medim  term, monetary policies in the G-3 seem set on a prudent
course, and budget deficits in the industa  countries are expected to decline modestly as a
percentage of GDP. Although commodity prices have surged in the past six months, measures
of core inflation, including unit labor costs, are at a historic low.  This is a very different
scenario from the  hike  in  interest rates and economic recession combination that hit  the
developing world in 1980-82, as high and rising inflation induced monety  policies to tighten
suddenly.
B.  There are two important caveas to this overalpositve  outlook
B.1.  Even with sustained overall private capit  flows, individual countries are likely to
expeience  volatility in financidal  flows and changing terms of access to  capital markets.
Private investors respond with alacrity to a worsening of economic  prospects or to the threat of
political instability (e.g. a reputed $10 bn. had flown out of Mexico in the second quarter of
1994).
Take the  18 countries which, between them, account for over  80  percent of  these
inflows (see Table 2 later in the text).  Among them, vulnerability, as measured by a wide
range of indicators, varies considerably.  For  example, based on the trend of the last five
years,  three of these countries-India,  Mexico, and to a  smaller extent, Argentina4- would
Hungay,  Polamd,  and the Republics  of the FSU, which have attracted 10 per  of pnve  capital flows,
could be added to tbis list though  they are clearly a special  case in many respects.
3accumulate  foreign  liabilities  at a rate which greatly exceeds  the growth of their exports.
These  countries,  which  account  for 21 percent  of private  inflows  to developing  countries,  will
probably  need  to engineer  a soft landing  of their current  account  deficit  in the not too distant
future, or at least to show a step proression in exports that would enable  them to carry
increased  foreign  liabilities  comfortably.
Two  other countries,  Turkey  and Venezuela,  which  together  account  for 6 percent  of
flows, have seen a marked  deterioration  in economic  performance  in the last two years on
account  largely  of domestic  policies. High fiscal  deficits,  appreciation  of the real exchange
rate, and deteriorating  current  account  positions,  have combined  to force a retrennt  in
demand  and a deceleration  in output. Venezuela  is, in addition,  suffenrng  from the sharp  fall
in oil prices  in the last  year.
B.2.  Portfolio  equity, which in 1993  represented  about 30 percent of total private flows
but gets the lion's share or media coverage,  is Olely  to display  more volatility  both across
countries  and in the aggregate. Although  the findamental  reasons  for investing  in emerging
markets  are sound, many analysts  believe that periods  -of extraordinary  appreciation  have
induced a herd instinct  amongst  investors-one  that holds within it the seeds  of subsequent
disillusion. Some  correction  has already  taken  place in recent  months,  but a few emerging
markets  remain  overbought. Recent  PIE ratios in Argentina,  Columbia,  India, Hungary  and
Poland  were more than double the average  for US and European  markets. More generally,
emerging  markets  suffer  from limited  liquidity  and poor  regulation  and infrastructure.  A crisis
in one market  or the other  may well develop  as these  markets  mature;  but the volatility  in asset
prices  will, to some  etent,  mitigate  the volatility  in overall.  developing  country  financing.
C. A  policy response is  needed in  cases where lavre curfent account defiit  are
unsustinable.-
Governments  cannot  anticipate  some  adverse  developments  - such  as those in Mexico
earlier in the year, but they can take steps  to reduce  their vulnerability  to sudden  reversals  in
market sentiment.  All large recipients  should srenghen  the institutional  and regulatory
framework  of  capital markets and the banking sector, and build firewalls as needed to
strengthen  the solvency  and liquidity  of the banldng  system  in the face of unanticipated  large
extermal  shocks. Among  vulnerable  countries,  situations  differ greatly  and policies  have  to be
specifically  tailored.  An importa  first step is to esfimate  whether large current account
deficits  are sustainable  in the longer  term. Especially  if  ihe  answer  is a likely  no, subsequent
steps  to consider  are:
Expos of  Mndia  have  grown  by 20%  in the  last  year,  but it is too early  to conclude  dat  his ren
the affirmation  of a new rend.
4*  Reducing  large budget deficits and high real interst  rates where they are the factors
primarily  responsible  for inducing  the inflows.
*  Ensuring that the policy and incentives  structure  encourages  both the use. of capital
(domestic  and exteral)  to support investment  and the growth of exports, which will
provide  the basis for sustained  creditworthiness.  . This requires  an open.  trade regime,
eliminating  regulations  and unnecessary  tax or  bureaucratic  burdens to exports, and
avoiding  overvalued  exchange  rates.
*  Restricting  cnpital  inflow  is unlikely  to be an effective  long-term  measure,  but may  serve  at
times  to fore  stall speculative  inflows. Likewise,  widening  exchange  rate bands  may serve
to discourage  speculation.  '  Opening  up opportnities for residents  to invest  abroad  also
helps  to buy the benefits  of asset diversification  while  relieving  pressure  on the exchange
rate.
The current  international  economic  environment  is more favorable  than it has been  for
20 years. World  output,  weighted  by the share  of developing  country  exports,  is growing  at
close to 3% a year, and inflation  and oil prices  are at near historic  lows.  This provides  a
window of opportny  for cuntries to adjust  their domestic  imbalances  and achieve  a soft
landing.  Policy measures  to achieve  this are likely to be much less disruptive  while the
countries  have the confidence  of intertional  investors,  and the external environment  is
favorable,  than when  a crisis  is at hand.
M.  THESUSTMNABITOFPRIVATE  CAPITAL  PLOWS
A.  -Our man  concluion is that, while private  flows  to developing  counties will not
continue to grow at rates seen in recent  years, a generated  reversal  in capia flows is
unfikely  for the  following  three reasons:.
A.1. A large  proportion  (over  40 percent)  of the prvate flows  are accosted for by foreign
direct investment  (See  Table  1).
Given the importance  of FDI in net private  flows, un  ng  its cha  is
central  to the analysis  of sustainability.  FDI  to developing  countries  has grown  at a fairly  steady
rate of 30 percent a year sin  1987. Behind  the surge is the increased  pursuit of globalization
strategies by compaies.  These strategies have included investment in  low-cost locations,
building distnbution channels in  untapped markets, developmen of  new  sources of  raw
materials, and preemptive  acquisition  of privatized companies.  Underlying the strategies have
been  improvements  in communications  and tansportion,  and a growing  tendency  of companies
to focus  their businesses  on highly  specialized  niches  which  can, and need  to be, exploited  on a
global  scale.
5Table 1. Aggreate Net Long-Term  Resource  Flows  to Developing  Countries
(U.S.$  bill.)
1990  1993'
Total  102.1  209.0
Total  less  grants  73.6  141.2
Official  59.1  53.0
of which  gran  28.5  31.1
Private  loans  (et)  and  ban  k  12.9  45.0
FDI  26.3  65.0
Portfolio  equity  (estimated)  3.8  46.9
Total  private  flows  43.0  157.0
Prliminary  esdmates;  dtese are higher  than die estmates given in World Debt Tables, 1993-1994,  by.
more dm  U.S.SB40.  The upward revision  prmariy  in the portfolio debt catego;  eve  te  above
estimas  are conserva-'ve.
Source: World Banlk World Debt Tables 1994-1995 (draft).
In re  years, developing  counes  have atacted  a high share of FDI flows as
industrial counties suffed  recession.  The share has risen from less hn  15 percent in the
second half of the 1980s to 31 percent in 1992, about equal to the proportion of wnrld GNP
accounted  for by developing  countries  (although  the share of GNP is higher on the basis of ICP
prces which use purchasing  power  parity exchange  rates).  The spread of economic  recovery  to
Japan and Europe will probably-  reduce the  share of  FDI going to  developing oouies
somewhat. But it will also improve the confidence  of companies  and increase their cash-flow
available  for for-eign  investment. Reflecting  the str  ral forces  discussed  above, the underlying
trend rate of growth of worldwide  foreign diret  mvestment  is very high, wel m excess of that
of world trade.  Even  before the onset of the latest  recession  in industrial  countries, in the period
1987-89,  the growth  rate of FDI flows  to developing  counties was in excess of 20 percent a year
in  eal tems.
Clearly, nessary  conditions  for FDI to continu to grow are that it is profitable  and that
dividend  payments and capital can be repatrid  in foreign curncy.  A rough estimate  of the
expected  cost of servicing ese  flows can be derived from data about the outstanding  stock of
6FDI in developing counties and the flow of repatriated profits.  In  1992 the stock was about
US$201 billion and the flow of remitted and reinvested profits about $23 billion, implying a
return on investment  of about 12 percent.  This is a lower than average on equity investment in
industial counties,  and, on fte  face of it, does not adequately compensate  for the higher risk
associated  with foreign investment. A possible  reason might be that many of these investments
are of recent vintage, and their book value may reflect market valuation more accurately than
measures  of the investnent stock in industrial  countries.
Profits (remitted or reinvestad) amounted to 42 percent of new net inflows of.FDI  in
1993, and are likely  to grow as a proportion of new inflows. Typically, remitted profits grow
rapidly in the.  early years foflowing  new investment. But even if net EDI flows were to grow at
one-third  the rate seen before the recession, that would be in line with the growth of developing
country imports.  In the 1980s, in the indusi  counties  the:  share of FDI in their domestic
capital formation increased substantially, reaing  for  example, 16 percent in  Belgium,  12
percent in the Netherlands, and 10 percent in the U.K. (reflecfing, in part, factors associated.
with the Euro xan Union).  EDI still usually  represents only a small fraction (2 to 3 percent, or
even less for some countries)  of the investment  in developing  counties.
'Of all the sources of private finance, FDI is likely to be -the least affected by a rise in
international nterest rates.  As in the case of  domestic investment, it is difficult to establish a
direct empirical link between these variables. To the extent that EDI flows are interest-sensitive
they will be more  affected by  long than short teum interest rates.  This  is  in  contrast to
commercial  bank loans which still represent the bulk of liabiities of middle income developing
cuntries.  Economic activity variables and liquidity constraints, as well as confidence factors,
appear to be much more important detminans  of foreign direct investent.  Only through the
indirect effects of interest rates on FDI (e.g., through recipient country creditworthiness) are
links likely  to be significant.
Loolkng to the longer term, EDI often entails a high proportion of two-way intra-firm
trade, sometimes  in the neighborhood  of 50 percent of final sales. It is not surprising, therefore,
that efforts by a large number of developing  countries to open up their trade and invetent
regimes in recent years have coincided  with the acceleation of these inflows.  At the same time-
regional initiatives in industrial countries, notably the single market program in Europe and the
US-Canadian Free  Trade Ageement,  have  stmlated  foreig  investment flows  within the
OECD.  On a priori grounds, preferential agreements among industial  counties  might have
been expected to divert foreign investment  away from developing  counies.  In pnctice,  greater
pressures to  reduce costs and  achieve scale economies as  cometdtion  in  the  OECD  has
intensified,  may well have icreased  interest in developig counties.
The completion of  the Uruguay Round of  GAIT  on  December 15,  1993 is  widely
expected to reinforce the adoption of globalization  strategies in the near term even though its
provisions are  not  yet  ratified and would only be  mplemented over  a  ten  year period.
Multilateral iberalization increases the expected retlrn of foreign direct investment and reduces
its risk.  ThoughFDI in some protected  markets wi  suffer from increased  compettion, the cost
7of cross-border  transactions  between  nmltiple  manufg  sites  and markets  will be reduced  as
tariffs  are cut. The risk  of reversal  in policies  of liberalization  is reduced,  and the likelihood  that
foreign  exchange  will be available  to fund  remitances  increases.
The North Amencan  Free Trade Agreement  between  Canada,  Mexico  and the United
States  came into effect  on Jamnary  1 1994. To a large extent it recognizes  an already  exist
situation  of intense  cross-border  activity. But it is, nevertheless,  the first example  of a far-
reaching  regional  integration  arangement  involving  industial counties and a large developing
country. Mexico  has a-  population  of 90 million  and income  per capita one-fifth  that of its two
partDers  to the North. The prospect  of its ratification  has been an important  factor  eCoAging
capital  inflow  to Mexico.
While  completion  of the Uruguay  Round  is liely  to lead to enhanc  levels  of FDI for
most  parts of the developing  world, as far as NAFTA  is concemed,  there  is some  concern  that is
often expressed  that it might adversely  affect  FDI flows to other developing  counties.  The
concems  are valid  to the extent  that, on the first  instance,  NAFTA  is expected  to contine to lead
to a modest  amount  of investment  diversion  away  from other  developing  counties. But, if it is
successful,  its longer  term implications  may  have  the opposite  effect for  the followng  reasons:
1.  Companies  in Europe  and Japan  have already  reacted  and wil conthie to react to the
prospect  that their North American  cetitors  are gaining  the advantage  of a larger
Uhome". market  and easy  access  to low-ost production  sites. Becase the competition  is
for global,  not  just regional  markets,  the reaction  will go beyond  increased  European  and
Japanese  investment  in Mexico  and in the larger  NAFTA  region. As they evaluate  tbeir
next invesutent, companies  will seek-out  the lowest costlagest  market  location with
which  they are most familiar. Thus, French  companies  may be encouraged  to look to
Morocco,  Japanese  compaimes-to  Indonesia,  and German  companies  to Poland.
2.  The  exports  of the United  States  are expected  to become  more  concentated  in high-value-
added-per-worker  activities. European  goverments will become  increasingly  concerned
that the United  States is  gining  in  high-tecimology  industies.  They  may then  press
ahead with more far-reaching regional integration  arrangemens  with lower-income
counties to their South and East.  Worry about migration  will play as important  a role in
justifying  these  ading  ens  as they did during the debate  on NAFTA  in the
U.S. Congress.
3.  Other  Latin  American  counties, surred by the prospects  of  the large gains  which  are
expected  to accrue  to Mexico,  are already  pressing  to join NAFTA. The experience  of
the European  Union since 1956 suggests  that the  is a strong bandwagon  effect in
regional  integration. This is in keeping  with trade  -teory,  which predicts  that small
countries  gain disproportionally  from a move to free trade.  In tbe Americas,  already
over 90% of the region's GNP is produced  within the free trade area. -If NAFrA is
enlarged  foreign  investment  will  -be  stimulated  furber.
8The possibility  that NAFTA  might in the long term encourage  investment  in other
developing  countries,  instead  of diverig  it to Mexico,  contradicts  the sundard  theory. In this
case, the theory's  main weakness  is its failure  to account  for the response  of parties  excluded
from the tading arrangement,  those  of governments,  as well  as those  of companies  operating  in
oligopolistc markets.
A2.  The sources of finance are much more diversified,  there is greater risk sharing
between  credio  and debtor, the private sector is increasingly  important as recipient,  and
developing  countries  still account for a disproportionately  small share of the portfolios  of
OEC)  investors.
Since  1989,  there  has  been  a strong  shift  in the composition  of private-source  flows  from
bank to a varied set of non-bank  sources.  They have included  transuational  coporations
invesig  directly,  managed  portfolio  investment,  money market funds, pension  funds, and,
insurance  companies. It has been argued  that these investors  are engaged  in a once-for-all
portfolio shift and are, tierefore, likely  to cause much  greater short-term  volatlity than
commercial  sbank.  The preceding  section  has argued  that  Foreign  Direct  Investent  -is likely  to
be less  volatile,  despite  the typically  strong  reflow  of profit remituances.  Most  important,  there
can be litle doubt  that the diversity  of the new sources  of fuids, and the large number  of
investors  involved,  lessens  the probabilty  of a sudden  and simultaneous  drying-up  of vohltary
lending,  as has happmed  in the past with bank loans. A reversal  of capital,  flows across  the
board is now more lkly  to be caused  by a country-specific  deterioration  in creditwortiness
rather  than  by international  developments  over  which  the country  has no control.
TWo  important  developments  behind  the diversificaton  of sources  of finance  have  been
the intenionaliztion  of U.S. institutional  funds  and the growth  of the mutaal  finds industry.
U.S. Pension  fimd  legislation  in the 1970s,  the so-called  ERISA  law, subst  pideial
stadards for quantitive guidelines  resulting  in a secular  upward  trend in the proporton of
asset held in foreip  securities. Mutual  fiuds, too, have experienced  a secular  trend.  The
assets  of the mutual-funds  idustry were only  one-enth  the size  of bank  -deposits  in the United
States  in the early 1980s,  but had grown  to be 85 percent  as large  by 1992. Mutual  funds  allow
small  investors  to hold  a much-diversified  set of instuments  by sharing  the cost of information
gatherin and of eff  g tasactions.  One rslt  has been to geatly expand  the market  for
eqities and bonds  issued  by small  and medim-sized  companies  in industr  counties.  The
more creditworthy  developing  countries  have  been only one group of borrowers  among  many
that  have been  able  to take  advantage  of the new  investment  vehicles.  Many  studies  have  shown
that OECD  investors  can get diversificaton  gains from investing  in emergmg  markets,  since
their correlation  with stock markets  in industrial-  countries  is relatively  low.  Nevertheless,
emerging  markets  account  for no more than  one percent  of pension  fund holdings,  even  though
they account  -for a six percent share of world'  stock market capitalization,  and developing
countries  are expeted to account  for over one-third  of the growth  in world  trade and output  in
the next 10 years.
9Another  stuctural factor that has facilitated  the new flows to developing  countries  is
increased  integration  of the global  capital  markets,  including  those in developing  countries.
Financial  integration  is measured  by the extent  to which  fiancial assets  are traded  goods. An
accompanying  concept  is the degree  of capital  mobility-that  is, the degree  of substitatability
between  domestic  and foreign  assets in investment  portfolios  (both domestic  and foreign).
Developing  countries  that  have opened  up their  capital  markets  have  participated  in the greater
global  financial  integration  arising  from reduced  conications  costs and a variety  of otber
factors  (e.g., changes  in securities  regulation  and taxation,  development  of derivatives  markets).
Although  cases of strong financial  integraton  are rare, the majority  of developing  countries
should  be regarded  as de facto  financially  open. 6
In the early years of the new privat  flows, repatiation of flight  capital,  some of it
through  managed  fimds,  played  an important  role in Latin  Americ.  It probably  accounted  for
more than half the flows.  More recently,  in 1993,  the proportion  appears  to have  dropped  as
institutional  investment  has gained  in importance. Some  have  suggested  that the limits  to the
amount  of flight  capital  imply  unsusinabiity.  Two  points  suggest  otherwise. First, the stock
of fligbt  capital  is very great, amounting  to roughly  nine fim  the annual  private  inflows  to
developing  counties according  to World Bank  estimates. Second,  it can be ared  that this
source represents  the "smart  money"  of insiders,  first to recognize  fimdam  l reforts.l
It  has also  been argued  that the recent equity  -flows  are driven  by opportunities  to buy
newly  prvatized  public  assets  and that,  hence,  it is a transitory  phenomenon.  In fact,  in the vast
majority  of developing  countries  the process  of privatization  has  at best  just started.  In any case,
future  availability  of investment  vehicles  would  depend  on growth  prospects  and the deepenng  of
finanial markets  to cover  many  private  as well  as public  corporations.
Debt, as opposed  to equity, still accounts  for 33 percent of all international  private
flows, but unlike the generalized  commercial  bank loans  of the 1970s,  this is mainly in the
form of bond issues  by about  20 of the more creditworthy  developing  countries. Bonds  are
not inherently  more stable  than bank loans, but the creditworfhiness  requirements  for issuing
bonds  in the major financial  centers  reduce  the risks of subsequent  default. Underlying  this
renwed access  is the fimdamental  reform in economic  and financial  policies  these couries
have  undertaken  over  the 1980s.
Though  bond  issuance  has surged,  accompanying  the shift  from  bank  to non-bank  sources
has been  a shift  in the mix  of financing  from debt  to equity. This  has taken  the forn of foreign
direct investment  (as noted  above)  and equity  portfolio  flows.  Equity  is more expensive  than
debt  and its return  rises with  growth  and inflation. On the other and, equty permits  bette risk
sharing  sinmce  profits  vary  with  the fortunes  of the corporate  sector.
6  Montiel, Peter J.  1992. -Capital Mobility  mi  Developing  Countries: Some  Measurement  Issues and
Empirical Esimates," Working  Paper Series  .1103,  World Bank.
10There has also been a strikdng  revival of private sector  borrowng in the i  onal
capital  markets. Private  to pnvate flows  now account  for nearly 65 percent of net long-term
flows to developing  countries. About half of all bond issues in the past year (1993)  have
originated  in the private  sector,  and direct  and equity  portfolio  investents accrue  entirely  to the
private  sector.
Some  have  argued  tt,  so long  as a high  proportion  of capital  flows  is private  to private,
and the government's  own accounts  are balanced,  policy  should  be indifferent  to the size of the
current  account  deficit. In view of many  unfortunate  experiences  with  speculative  bubbles  in the
past, the argument  seems specious. Indeed,  the negative  extemalities  of external  borrowing
point to an inbuilt tendency to overborrow.  Nevertbeless, incentives have certainly improved
since the 1970s:  lenders  need to scrutinize  the creditworthiness  of private sector borrowers
carefully, and -the  borrowers themselves are subject  to  market disciplines.  The implication is
that, over the long tm,  resources  are likely to be allocated  more productvely than if the
dominant  borrower  is the public sector.  Though ite possibility  exists that both lenders and
borrowers  are discounting  an eventual  socialization  of private  sector  labiltes,  (as  occuned, for
example,  in Latin America  during  the debt crisis; and this possibility  has impLications  for the
appropriate  policy  frmework to deal  with  the inflows),  on balance  the role played  by the private
sector  seems  to enbance  the prospects  for sustainabit.
A3.  A large and  prolonged increase in inenational  interest rates  would jeopardize
continued  growth in these flows,  but the probability  of such an increase  is snall in the next.
three to five years.
As discussed,  low international  interest  rates have been an importat cause behind the
surge  in private  capital  flows  to developing  counties. Since  the sharp  rise in ierest  ratm in the
early 1980's was a precipitting factor of the debt crisis, the  is a serious  concern  that the
scenario  might recur.  But whatever  form a new financial  crisis migh take, it is unlikely,  at
preset,  to emanate  from this source.  The debt crisis followed  two large oil shocks  which
contnrbuted  to a large rise in inflation  n idutrial  counties.  It also contrbuted to large current
accunt  deficits in  oil-importing  countries.  Some oil  exportng  developmg counties
overborrowed  against  fumre  oil exports. The decision  to shift  to much  tighter  monetary  policies
in  industia  countries in  1980 was designed to  stem inflation  Tight money coincided with
looser  fiscal  policies  and  led to a series  of very  larg;e  real interest  rate shocks. Six-month  LIBOR
rose from 6.4 percent per year in 1977  to  16.7 percent in 1981.  The deflationary  policy
succeeded,  but induced  a fail in demand  that contruted  to a large fall in commodity  pric  and
developmg  couty  export  volumes. As can be seen in Figure 1, the years precedig the debt
crisis  were the only  case  in the last 25 years  when  large interest  rate shocks  coicided with large
falls  in export  volumes  and a fall in commodity  prices.
in contrast,  although  most commodity  prices  have  gone  up in recent  months,  inflation  in
the industrial  countries  is now at a historically  low level, and industrial  country  out  is well
below  poteti  though  on its way to recovery. Programs  of medium  term fiscal  consolidation
have  been  legislated  in the United  States  and enshined in the Maastricht  Treaty  inagurating the
- . . ,  --  ~~~~11.-'f European  Union.  Short-term  interest  rates are likely to rise in the United States  as recovery
progresses  by perhaps  as much as 100-200  basis  points. In Europe,  they are likely  to stabilize
near current  fairly  high levels. In light of the growing  importance  of FDI and bond financing  at
fixed  rates  of interest,  long term interest  rates are becoming  more impornt  de  inans  of the
cost  of borrowing  of developing  countres. Long  term interest  rates  are, expressed  in real  tms
akready  close  to consensus  equihirium  levels, and have arguably  exceeded  these following  the
recent  trning point  in U.S. monetary  policies. Provided  inflation  remais subdued  they are not
expected  to rise significantly  from current  levels. The rise in interest  rates  is likely  to be more
than  offset  by hor  export  demand  for developing  country  exports.
To illustrate,  suppose  higher interest  rates result from a rapid investment-led  recovery
that spreads  to other industrial  counties from  the Unied States. Model  simudation  suggests  that
growth  in the industrial  counties would  be higher  by one percentage  point a year for 1994-96,
compared  to the current W,orld  Bank baseline forecast.  In  that contingency,  the rise -in
international  itrest  rates would  combine  with higher growth  in world  trade of 1.7 percentage
points  a year. Prices  of primary  commodities  would  improve  by 1.1  percentage  point  a year and
foreign  direct invesment  would (probably)  rise or remn  near curent levels.  If, under this
scenaro, interest rates rise by, say, 300 basis points, the debt-service  ratios of the 18 lare
private  capital  importers  would  stay  unchanged  provided  their  exports,  in current  dollars,  rose  by
8 percent  above  the baseline  at the end of three  years. Such  a rise would  be  Mflly  consistent  with
the assumption  of this stronger  recovery.
B.  Tere  are two im  ort  caves  to tis  ovenii positive outook
-B.1. Even with sused  overall private apital flows, individual  countries  are likey to
expeence volatility  in financial  flows  and changing  terms  of  access  to capital markets.
On  he  pr"  side, the major detminant  of sustainability  are the recipient  cotry's
domestic  pooLcies,  and its overall  growth  and export  e.  Private  capital  inflows  are
more likely  to be sstainable if they reflect  a structnal improvement  inthe couny's  ability  to
grow its exports and import-compet than if they are attracted by a  tightenig  of credit
conditions,  or a bull run on its curmenc  or stock  exchange. In assessing  susiabilit,  we can
distinguish  in principle  between  changes in the real economy  (arising from e.g.,  improved
productivity,  higher  rates of inxvestime,  deprcaon  of real exchange  rate, fiscal  consolidation,
tariff reform,  privatzaion, etc.) and changes  in financial  conditions  (e.g., availability  of credit
and the level of real interest  rates). Reviews  of country  eqperience  (eg., Cozbo  and Henandez,
1993? suggest  that the dominnt factors  attracting  capital  inflow  have  been stmcral  changes
This is a standard  result  of econometric  simuations  of the  effects  of a demand  expansion  of industial
countries  on developing  counties. Especially  if dIe  initial  condition  is low capacity  utilization,  demand  expanson
has a more  powerful  favorable  effect  than  the adverse  effect  of the subseqpent  rise i  inerest rates.
See Schadler,  et al. "Recent  Experienes with  Surges  in Capil  Inflows."
12such as tade  libealizaion' privatation, tax reform,  and financial  sector linberizaon.  A
proper  assessment  requires  a country-by-country  analysis  that wourd  replicate  the work  of credit
agencies  and  is beyond  the scope  of this paper.  This  secton, and the accompaying  Appendix  2,
V. Corbo  and L Hernamdez  (1993). "Maoonomic  Adjusment  to Capital  Inflows Porfolio
Investment  in Developing  Countries,  World  Bank  Discussion  Paper,  ad. S.  Claesens  and S. Gooptt: 353-371.
13Figure  1.  Shocks  to Short-Term  Interest  Rates  versus
Shocks  to Real  Comnmodity  Prices  and  Export  Growth
(Shded  n  show  perods  of  htide  hiteanse shock)
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14aims  to provide  a birds-eye  view of sustainabiliy  among  major  recipients  by focusing  on a few
key  variables:  export  growth,  curent account  deficits,  debt-ratios  and investnent  pmance.
As noted  in the introduction  to this note,  the distribudon  of private  capital  flows  has been
uneven.  For the most part, low-income  countries  have not benefited  from icreased private
capital  flows. Excepting  China,  India  and Indonesia,  the 18 that have  accounted  for 90 percent
of the flows  in the last  three  years  are middle-income  countries  (Table  2). Judged  by traditional
mesures of creditworfth  , the ability  of these  countries  to attract  and service  capital  iflows
has improved  markedly  since te  height  of the debt crisis.  From 1987 to 1993  their median
debt/export  ratio fell from 2.6 to 1.9, and their median debt-service/export  ratio improved
markedly,  from  33 percent  to 23 pern.  China  has been  by far the largest  recipient  of any
developing  country,  accountng  for 24 percent  of the flows of private  capital. Judging  by the
trends of the last 15 years, China's  export  potential  is vcry high, and, since it has, until
recently,  run current  account  surpluses,  its foreign  li2bilities  are low.
ID  Due to data limitations  witi respect to the FSU counies,  some of the statistics  quoted  in the rest of the
paper arc for the remainig  17 counties.
15Table  2. Private  Capital  Flow S  nabii  Analykis
18 Selected  Countries
Share  in
Priwie Flows
to LMlCs (%B)  Debt/Esport  Rato  Debt-Service/Export
Ratio (%)
(1991-93f  - 1987  1993  1987  1993
China  24.0  0.9  0.9  10  . .11
Mexico  12.4  3.6  2.4  40  34
Korea  7.2  0.7  0.5  32  7
USSR/FSU  7.1  0.5  2.2  12  5
Argentina  6.6  7.0  3.9  74  35
Malaysia  6.0  1.1  0.5  21  6
Portugal  5.7  1.1  1.3  33  . 19
Brazil  4.7  4.3  .2.7  42  30
Thailand  4.0  1.3  1.0  22  14
Tutkey  3.3  2.5  1.9  36  28
Venezuela  2.5  2.7  2.3  38  25
Hungary  2.3  1.7  2.0  33  38
Iran  2.2  0.5  0.9  4  6
Mndia  1.6  3.0  2.8  31  26
Chile  1.3  3.3  . 1.7  36  23
Indonesia  1.2  2.6  . 2.2  37  29
Phippines  1.2  3.1  1.9  35  20
Poland  1.1  2.7  2.4  13  9
Median  3.7  2.6  1.9  33  23
Median of al  LMICs  0.0  _  2.7  2.3  22  14
The country number for 1993 are derived from World Debt Tables 1993-i994.  Thei  sum is smaller than
aggregate 1993 esimate in World Debt Tables 1994-1995  (draft) by U.S.$0-40  billion.
Source: World Bat  World Debt Tables 1993-1994.
However, traditional measures  of ctw  s,  such as the debt/export ratio and the
debt service/export  ratio, are of only limited  use in addressing  the questkio  of  Of
private capital  inflow  since  most of the new inflows  tke  the form of equity.  Fourhmore,
raditional creditwortiness ratios measure lvels  of indebtedness  rather than rends.  For
example,  take two couries  that have a debt/export  ratio of 2, the exort  tend  in one shows
growth at 10 percent a year, but is flat in the other. Which  can sustain  the larger defici?
Clearly,.the  first country  can sustain  larger  current  account  deficits  than the second. Exorts  of
many developing  counties have  accelerated  markedly  since around 1986-87,  and measures
capable  of accountig for this factor  are required.
16To address  this  problem,  we propose  to use technques  which  are commonly  applied
assess  die sstainabulit  of anothr  type  of deficit,  that  of goverments.  wThse  echniques  ha
led to what  are by now familia results. For examle,  that  a country  can rnm  a pridm
government  deficit (i.e.  a defiit  excluding net interest payms)  efitely  but only-  if
GDP growth  ratthe  trest  rate it pays on its debt.  Analogous results  can be obtak
in  the reonship  govening- current accoun  deficits, foreign liabilitie  and  the growth
exot  (see  Appeixlix  1).- 
-- Applying  this line of thiking,  -we can define  the  lasymptotic  lia
(AIE) as the ratio  to wbich  foreign  liabilitisexpts  will convge  on fte basis of exas
tends in exports  and the cuen  accoun.r We measutrends over a fivyear i  al o 
out ft-effec  of the  busines  cycle  and other  short-term  disances.  As shown  in Appendix
the ALE can be computed  simply  as
Cu,tM Accout Defict  -Cange in Export
or, alteatvely,
CurrentAccotDficit  . Change  in  Exports
Exports.  EXport
The lr  e  n  has the advant  that both nimeator and.  denominator  are u
free, allowing  us to compare  ec  across  countries  and over ti''e.'
-What  is a  eo  le level  of the ALE, one that  does not  -imply e  diffic
problems  smvin  foriign  libi  ies?  The  rule  of ftb  we can apply  is fte nme as t
commnly  -adopd in the casc  of the deblexprt ratio,  and that  nnmber  is 2.  This  is rmug
equivale to  -a nrle  that  ibe  cost of servcing forin  liabities should  amount  to no more  th;
40  -percent  exports,  a  mng  th  the foreign  investors  expect  a 10 percent  anmal return  a
r-over  their  capital.  every 10 years.
We can  use the  ALE  to tc-k  of private  flows  to large  ients  (Figur
The  central  observation  is that  the  median  rae of growth  of exports  of the  18 large  recipents  -I
nsen madly  simcete debt  cnsis, and the  median  cuet-accuntde  s has  dlid.  A
result the mtedian  liability/export  (A  rao  of  e 18large recipients  of priv
capital  flows  has i  markedly.  Compaig the  hegh of ft debt-cisis  with  the last  th
years,  the  ratio  is lower  by a flr  of 8 and  is now  close  to  -is  histori low. The  medin curfaccount  deficit,  expressed  as a ratio  to exports  is lower  than  at any  time since  1960,  and less than
half that during  the nm-up  to debt crisis in 1982. The recovery  in export  growth  rtes  in the
second  half of the 1980's and its persistence  in recent years is especially  noteworthy. It has
occurred  against  the background  of  recession  in the industrial  countres and weakaess  in
commodity  prices.
Given  a target  liability/export  ratio, the sustaiable capital  inflow  is direcdy  proportional
to the difference  between  the  export  growth  rate and.  the interest  rate.  13 Let us say  that the target
ALE  is 2, then  the following  relationship  holds:
- N-  =  2  x  (Growth  of Exports  - Interest  Rate).
Exports
For example,  since  around  1987,  the fall  in interest  rates  and the acceleration  in exports  of
developing  countries  has amounted  to about  0.03  in each  case. This  has meant  that sustainable
net transfers  have  risen  by 2 x 0.06  0.12 of developing  country  eWorts  or about  $120  billion
a year.
Figure  3 shows  how sustaimble  net transfers  have  evolved  for the 18 large recipients  of
private  capital  inflow,  and how they compare  with actal net transfers. It has  been  assumed  that
the interest  rate facing  these countries  is 300 b.p. above  LIBOR. The charts  show  that, until
about 1989, sustainble net tansfers were negative  reflecting  the fact that the average  export
growth  rate of these  counties was below the interest  rate.  Actual  net tafers  were, in fact,
negative  though  still higher than the suainable level.  Since 1989 actual  t transfers  were
below  sustinable  net transfers,  though  they have  converged  recently  reflectig a deceleration  in
Let  L denote  foregn liabilides;  X, exports  of goods  and  nonfactor  servces;  M. imports  of goods  and
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18exports. Overall,  the model-generated  sustinable net transfers  tends  to track acua  transfers
frirly well  in overall  trend,  though  deviations  are often  large.
19Figure  2
Asymptotic  Liability/Export  Ratio  and Components
(Moving  averages  with  4 lags)
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Figure  3
Sustainable and Actual Transfers:
17 selected countries
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b/Uding  USOR  plu300  b=  points  andnALEf2..Which  counties are most vulnerable  to exrnal  or domestic  shocks  that woud induce  a
reversal  of private capital  flows? As already mentioned,  even for the 18 large recipients  of
private  capital  flows a comprehensive  review  of vulnerability  is well beyond  the scope of this
paper.  Nevertheless,  in Appendix  2, we provide  a summary  assessment  for 8 counties in the
sample  of large recipients. Based  on a first pass review  of some 10 indicators  of vulnerability,
including  the ALE, these countries  ranked in the bottom  half of our 18-country  sample. The
countries  are:  Argentina,  Brazil, Hungry, India, Mexico, Poland,  Turkey, and Venezla.
Some  republics  of the FSU  would  have  been  icluded had adequa  data  been  avalable.
The reassuring  fact is dth only  5 of the 18 counties in the sample-FSU,  Hungary, ndia,
Mexico, and Poland-exhibit  ALE ratios above the benchmark  of 2,  and of the remaining
countries,  only  Argendna  has a ratio somewhat  close  to 2 (fable 3).  The countries  of the FSU,
like Hungary  and Poland  clearly a special  case, have seen exports  fall  by 22 percent  a year in
the last three years.  The ratio for the FSU (ifinity)  simply tells us that if the recent expence
of failing exports pesists,  some of these countries  cannot service li  ;a  of any level.
Hungary  (5.1) and Poland  (13.6) also have  unacceptably  high ALE ratios  Ad need to proceed
steadiy with  their reforms  if tbey are to reduce  their vulnerability.  Mexico's  ratio is 3.6.  Tbis
means  that Mexico  needs  to cut its current  account  deficit  by well over  half or more  than double
its export  owth  rate if it is to  avoid future difficuties in servicing  its exteal  liabilities.
Without  such adjustmet, it will, on the trend of the last  five years, need  to devote  more  than a
third of its exports  to intrest and dividends  alone  if the average  expected  return of investors  in
Mexico  is, say, just 10 percen  ldia's  ratio at 2.1 is also high and it needs to consolidate  the
gams  made  by the export sector  last year in order to bring down  the ratio.  The AIE ratio for
Argentina,  at 146,  is also  on the high side. In the last three years, Argentina  and Mexico  have
suffered  real exchange  rate a  iations  of 19.1  percent  and 8.6 percent  respectively.  The mere
passage  of time inese  the vulnerabilit of these counties to external  shocks  or contagious
currency  crises  which  might  begin  in other  counties.
21Table  3.  Asymptoic Liability  Export Rato and Its Components
18 Selected  Countries
Current  Account  Asymptotic
Export Growth  Deficit  to  Liability  to
(% p.a.)  Export Ratio (%)  Export Ratio
(1989-93)  (1989-93)  (1989-93)
China  12.5  -6.0  -0.5
Mexico  8.7  31.7  3.6
Korea  6.5  2.2  0.3
USSR/FSU  -12.0  ...  Go
Argendna-  9.0  14.1  1.6
Malaysia  -15.6  4.0  0.3
Portugal  8.6  -0.0  -0.0
Brazil  4.2  -0.4  -0.1
Tbailand  14.5  17.3  1.2
Turkey  8.7  5.8  0.7
Venezela  6.0  -5.4  -0.9
Hungary  1.3  6.3  5.1
Iranl  11.7  15.5  1.3
India  8.3  17.3  2.1
Chile  7.5  7.2  1.0
Indonesia  13.4  7.8  0.6
Philippines  10.9  12.2  1.1
Poland  0.8  10.2  13.6
Median  8.7  7.2  1.0
Median  of aUl  7.3  15.3  1.8
SSorce: World Bank: World Debt Tables 1993-1994  and IMF: Inemational Financial Statistics.
There are  two countries in -the sample, Turkey and- Venezuela, that through 1993
continued to  exlnhbit  favorable AIE's  but where economic  eormance  has  deteriorated
markedly  in the Last  two years. Venezuela's  ALE is higbhly  volatile  reflecting  its reliance  on oil
exports.  Both countries are suffering from the progressive spillover of internal imbalances,
especially  budget  deficits, onto exteal  performance.
Ten other countries in the sample, representing 60 percent of private capital flows to
developing countries txhibit  ALE ratios well below 2.  Assuming prudent macroeconomic
management, their  situation  should  prove  robust  to  plausible  adverse  scenarios  in  the
international  economy. For example,  under the Low Case scenario  of Global  Economic
22Prospects 1994 (GEP '94), the World Bank's annual prospects publication, the growth rate of
exports of these countries drops to 6 percent from 10 percent p.a. in the baseline.  Their current
account  deficits, expressed  as a percent of exports, increase  from 5 to 6 percent in the baseline  to
7.9 percent, implying  an asymptotic  liability/export  ratio of 1.25, still within reasonable  bounds.
Looking to the longer term, the history of the last 30 years suggests  that the possibility  of
a renewed build-up of inflationary  pressures in the industrial countries  as recovery  consohLdates  is
considerable.  Recent examples can be drawn from the experience of recovery phases in the
United States.  Consumer price inflation accelerated  from 1.1% in  1986 to 4.5%  in 1988, and
the federal fimds  rate peked  at around 10%.  In the run up to the debt crisis inflation rose from
4.9% in 1976 to in excess  of 10% thre  years later.  The risk of a surge in inflation  increases if,
in an attempt to sustain or stimulate  demand, monetary  policies in the industrial counties remain
loose over an extended  period.  If, in conjunction,  plans to achieve fiscal consolidation  are not
implemented, the risk rises furthffer.  We will-  come back to this contingency in the concluding
section.
Rising inflation, especially when accompanied by  a  short-lived boom in  commodity
pnces,  may give developing counties  a false sense of security as the nominal value of their
exports  s  in comparison to  extemal debt  and the real value of debt declines.  The
element of surprise clearly was a factor in the severity of the debt crisis.  In the run-up to the
crisis, export growth in developing countie  was in the range of 20 percent a year combined
with very high current account  deficits, which were in the range of 15 percent of exports.  Most
of the export growth was due to pnce ines  which could not be sustane  once the tighter
monetary policies  bad their effect.  Mexico, Argentia  and Inda  have current account deficits
which are proportionally  much higher today than the median country at the start of the debt crisis
and their export growth is lower.'4 They also exhibit less favorable ratios today than they did in
1982. Unless these countries  tae  coretve  measures  they will be very vulnerable  to a scenano
of rising inflation followed by a monetary correction, or to other adverse scenarios such as a
protractd  demand recession  in industrial  countries.
B.2.  Portfolio equity, which in 1993  pre  about  30 pecent  of total  private  flows
but gets the lion's share of media coverage, i  likely to display more volatility both across
countries and in the aggregate.
It is possile  to imagine  a series of balance-of-payments  or exchange  rate crises spreading
from country to  country, triggered by  problems in  one or two large recipients.  The Latin
American  debt crisis in 1982 is an example.
In the  last  year lIdia's export  growth  has  picked  up to a rate of 20% a year, suggesting  that  its policies  of
liberalization  are  begining  to work.
23Longer  term, as portfolio  equity becomes  more ipOrtant,  it could become  tbe-  most
probable  source  of a contagious  crisis. The  expected  return  on equity  investments  is, because  of
their risk, much higher  than that on bonds  or commercial  bank loans. iteir  volatlity  is high
reflecting  the behavior  of stock  markes and the relatively  liquid  natme of these invents.
Stock  markets  are strongly  prone  to overshoot  and develop  specuative  bubbles. This  is likely  to
be even  more  true of developing  country  markets,  which  are charactrized  by co  vely  thin
taiding  volumes,  cumbersome  setdement  procedures,  often  weak  disclosure  rqirent,  and
inadeqate investor  protection  laws (e.g., against  iider  )t  ).  Thus, it would not be
surprising  if from  time to time  some  of these  markets  suffered  sharp  coections.  In that event,
there might  be a contagion  effect on stock  markets in neiboring  com:ntries,  though the empirical
evidence  of the past  few  years  suggests  that.  it would  not necessarily  be the case. Probably  some
investors  would  withdraw  entrely from equity  invesurnent  in developing  countries. But such
consequences  would  not constitute  a generalized  financial  crisis.
The probability  of a contagion  cnrsis  increases  greatly  if the perception  develops  that
many  counties  have  become  vulnerable.  One  way  this can  happen  is if the countries  represent  a
"risk  chlster"  in the sense  that  they are exposed  to the same  variable,  and that variable  (e.g., oil
pnces, interest  rates)  moves  in a directon  adverse  to them.
Memories  of the debt  crisis  are stil fresh  and  many  inexperienced  investors  have  recely
entered  emerging  markets. As  discussed  above,  a few large  recipients  of funds  are vulnerable  to
shocks. In the event of a genealized reversal  of private capital  flows, the effect  on many
developing  counties would  be severe,  though  less  dramatic  than at the time  of the debt  crisis.
This is because  current  account  deficits  are proportionally  about  one-third  as large as in 1982,
and becau  of the greater  equity  component  in outsndg  liabilities. The  effects  on the world
financi  system  would  also  be less pronounced  than the debt  cnsis.  This is, fist,  beas  the
risk is much more widely shared among-  a -wide range of investors, inchlding  non-nk
crporations and individuals. And, second,  because  few investors  will have stakd  a large
proportion  of their assets in developing  country  markets,  especially  in the high-risk  equity
instruments  which e  the majory of the flows.
It can  also  be argued  that  the rapid  resoation of credit  to counries  that suffered  from  the
debt  crisis  represents  a reassuring  featre of the current  ineational  financial  environent  In
this regard,  the afemath of the debt crisis  of the 1980s  differs  sharply  from that of the 1930s.
Then  also,  a combination  of collapse  of commodity  prices  and sharp  decline  of world  trade  led to
major  debt defaults. But, although  most of the defaults  were settled,  other factors,  such  as a
proliferation  of capital  controls  and lack  of a coordinated  approach,  led to a virual extiction of
the inerational capital  marlkts.  Conseently,  it took nearly  fou  decades  for the defaulting
countries  to regain access to intemational  sources of finance.  By contast,  the managmen of
the recent  debt  cnrsis  was  characteized  by inteive  cooperation  on the part of the major  actors-
creditors,  debtors,  policymakers,  and international  organizations.  The tred  of capital  and trade
iberalization,  which  had been  a salient  feature  of the post-war  period, soon  resumed. Thus,  in
the 1990s,  there  is probably  greater  confidence  in the mechanims  of the international  finail
24system to alleviate free,rider problems and to weather debt servicing  difficulties  without
enormous  disruption.
C.  A  policy response is  needed in  cases where large current account deficits are
umsustamnable.
Private  capital  flows  bring important  benefits,  including  lower  cost of capital, improved
reserve position, and, in the case of FDI flows, enhanced access to foreign technology,
marketing  channels,  and m  ment  know-how. Beyond  a certain point, however,  private
capital  flows present  considerable  challenges. Most important  among  these are overvaluation
of  the- real exchange rate,  inflationary  pressures, unsustainable  current account deficits
(iduced through  both  price and income  channels)  and loss of monetary  control  associated  with
rapid monetary  base growth.
Thus, a fine line is tread between  extracting  maximum  benefits  from capital inflows
and losing  control  over key policy  targets. Several  recent studies  have explored  what does and
does not work in the presence  of "excessive"  capital  infiows-though  there does not appear  to
be any accepted  definition  of 'excessive."  There is general agreement  that, in the event  of
"excessive"-  capital  inflow, reducing  budget deficits is the most effective  way of alleviating
pressure  on the domestic  interest  rate and exchange  rate, thus accommodating  the inflow. And
there is also agreement  that attempts  to sterilize  the inflows or to control them directly are
ineflectaal  measures  except  in the short term.
In developing  policy  recommendations,  it is useful  to try to be more  precise  about  what
represents  an 'excessive" level  of capital  flows, and how policies  should  differ  when  the flows
are below or above  that level.  Though  there are no magic formulas,  it is possible  to clarify
policy options  by distnguishing  among  cases  where the current account  deficit  is thought  to be
sustinable or not, and where the current account  deficit is over- or underfina.  For the
purposes  of this analysis  we will say that the current  account  deficit is under-financed  if long-
term capital  flows are less thn  the current account  deficit, that is, the basic balance is in
deficit. Implicitly,  therefore, short-term  capital  flows are viewed  as "hot money" and/or as
compensating  for the financing  shortfall.
Figure 4 sets out the four possible combinations  and, in each case, the broad policy
measures to consider on  a first-pass.  Figure 5  indicatively  applies the schema to  39
developing  counties selected  on the basis of their exports  m 1993.  -For this purpose,  countries
with an ALE ratio less than 2.0 over 1989-93  are classified  as having sustanable current
account  deficits. On the financing  dimension,  countries  with aggregate  net resource  flows  less
than  their  current  account  deficits  over  1989-93  arc.  heuristically charactized  as
underfinanced.  1  While  the focus  of the paper is on countries  receiving  sizable  private capital
flows, for the sake of completeness,  the following  discussion  includes  brief comments  on
indicated  policy  measures  for other  combinations  as well.
See World Debt Tables for the  World Bank's definition  of net resource flows.
25Figure 4. Policies To Manage  Capital Inflow
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26An important  observation  suggested  by Figure  5 is that countries  whose  current  account
deficit is defined as unsustainable  (ALE >  2) were generally  not able to finance sizable
deficits  with long-term  capital inflow  alone, Hungary  being a clear exception  and India to
some  extent. More  than 20 countries  whose  current  account  deficit  is defined  as sustainable
(ALE < 2), on the other  hand, were able  to attract  long-term  capital  in excess  of their  current
account  deficit, nine of them being large recipients. This suggests  that markets "work";
investors  are reluctant  to commit  long-term  fiuds in countries  that are prima  facie suffering  a
funamdental  current account  deficit problem.  Countries  such as Peru, Cote d'Ivoire, and
Poland  represent  extreme  cases  of underinancd and  uninable  current  account  deficits.
Where  the  current  account deficit is  judged  sustainable but  is  nevertheless
underfinanced  (the bottom  left-hand  quadrant),  policies  should  be geared  to encourage  new
long-term  capital  inflow  by liberalizing  the inward  investment  regime. Other  policy  responses
will depend  on initial  conditions,  but might include  a looser  fiscal  (e.g., through  tax cuts) and
tighter monetary.  policy  to simultaneously  induce  a rise in interest rates and stimulate  short-
term growth,  both of which  will  tend to attract  more  inflow  of capital.
The bottom  right-hand  quadant illustrates  the unsusle  and undefinanced  case.
This is a contingency  where  the choice  of policy  is usually  clear-cut,  tough painful: a mix of
expenditure-switching  and  expenditure reducing policies, possibly takng  the  form of
devaluation,  combined  with restraints  domestic  absorption,  usually  in the form of reduction  in
govemment  spending,  tax increases,  and encouragement  of wage  moderation.
The case  where  the current  account  deficit  is within  sustainable  limits  but overfinaced
(the  top left-hand  quadrant)  is in many  ways the least  problemac.  A number  of counties fit
this class, including  Chile and Malaysia. The effects  of the capital  inflow  on demand,  the
exchange  rate, and the money  supply  are offset  to some  extent  by the current  account  deficit.
Appropriate  policies  in this case may include  furter  liberalization  of the current  and capital
account  and/or  an appreciation  of the real exchange  rate.
The fourth case is where  the cent  account  deficit  has reached  unsustainable  levels
but is, nevertheless,  overfinanced  by long-term  capital  alone (the top right-handudrant).
Especially  where  the inflow  of long-term  capital  is accompanied  by sizable  short-term  inflows,
which  sometimes  constitute  "hot" money,  this is the contngency  that presents  policy  makers
with the greatest  challenges. On the basis of the last 5 years' data, among  the recipients  of
significant privaate flows, Hungary clearly belongs in this category, and Argentina,  ndia  and
Mexico  are borderline  cases  (although  India's exports  have  staged  a strong  recovery  recently).
Because  of the tndency of the exchange  rate to bec6me  overvalued,  the situation  has often
been  compared  with  Dutch  disease. The  comparson  is inappropriate,  however. Since  foreign
loans  have  to be repaid,  this is actually  Dutch  disease  without  the boom of natral  gas  finds!
The precariousness  inherent in an unsustainable  yet overflanwxd  current account deficit
suggests that the cause is either that the markets are reacting to berd instincts (e.g., a bull run
on the stock  market or an overbeating  economy), or that policy is artifcially distorting private
27sector behavior.  The solution in either case is to deal directly with the distortion or-anomaly-
be it excessive  growth expectations, large goverment  spending, overly tight monetary policy,
or rationed domestic credit.  There will be cases where the government simply needs to take
steps to dampen expectations, and to make sure that, as a minimum, it is not enouraging the
inflow directly by its own actions (e.g., borrowing abroad by government  enterprises).  Since,
by definition, this is a case where the surge in capital inflows is temporary, it would not seem
appropriate to incur the large adjustment  cost implied first by revaluation then devaluation of
the exchange rate.  In fact, revaluing the exchangc rate in this case is an implicit admission  of
policy failure to deal with the underlying source of the problem.  Allowing the exchange rate
to revalue may be the most expedient  course but also the most damaging longer term.
Provided  the  problem  of  unsustainablefoverfinanced  current  account  deficits  is
diagnosed early enough, the solution can take the form of multi-year plans of adjustment,
designed to  achieve a  soft-landing.  Policies will often place the  emphasis on  gradually
removig  various hindances  to  export  growth,  rather  than  painful  and  faster-working
measures to restrain imports.  Govermnent  deficits can be reduced gradually. The prescription
is to ensure that the policy and incentives  structure encourages  the use of capital (domestic and
external) to  support investment, and the growth of exports that will provide the basis for
sustained creditworthiness.  This requires an open trade regime, eliminating reguladons and
unnecessary  tax or bureaucratic  burdens to exports, and avoiding  overvalued excange  rates.
Eventually,  countries in  the  top  right  hand  quadrant will  shift  gradualy  either
downwards, towards a currency crisisldevaluation  scenario, or, if their cuet  account  and/or
export position improves, leftwards to where policies of current account and capital account
liberalizadon  become clearly  apprpriate.
Should a  country in the top right-hand quadran  (unsusttinableloverfnaned)  engage
directy  in  liberalization of  the  current  account (or  even the  capital account)?  Further
liberalization  would relieve pressure on the exchange rate, on growth of money supply, and on
domestic demand.  However, sine  the iniial  condition is an unsustainable current account
deficit, furher  liberalization in  dis- instance can be  a  high risk  stategy,  which,  in  an
environment  of unstable expectations,  could accelerate a foreign exchange  crsis  (movement  to
the South-East  in the figure).
There may, of course, be cases where what looks like unsustainable  current account
deficits  urs  out to be a shift to a new  higher  growth path of exports.  For exaIple,  new, and
better, policies may induce a large inflow of capital which represents a one-time adjustment  to
a perceived improvement in competitiveness. In these cases one would expect to see a fairly
rapid increase in  investment (rather  han-  consumption and government spending), and an
improvement in profitability and acceleration of output growth in  the economy's tradable
sector. All this underlines the importance  of looldng at a wide set of indicators to form a view
about sistinability  of current account  deficits, but does not detract from the need to form such
a view before deciding  on policies!
28IV.  CONCLUSIONS
This paper  argues  that the surge  of private  capital  flows is beneficial  for investment  and
growth  and that these  flows  are likely  to continue. However,  there  is a clear need  to recognize
the necessity  of eventual  adjustnent  in certain  counties who are large  recipient of these  flows.
And there is a need  to persevere  with policy  reform since  policy slippage  can lead to a quick
reversal  of investor  sentiment  (as evidenced  by Turkey  and Venezuela,  for example). This is
especially  opportn  now since the current favorable intrational  econmic  environment
provides  developing  countries  with a widow of opportunity  to take  corrective  measures  while
rtning  the confidence  of investors. A large rise in inflation  in indutrial countries  in the next
few years  would  provide  the most important  warning  of deterioration  in international  rsk factors
affecting  susinability of private  capital  flows.  A modest  rise in short-term  interest  rates as
recovery  in the industrial  countries  consolidates  is to be expected. Its effect on developing
countries  is likely to be more than offset  by improved  demand  conditions,  as well as by the
prospt  of more sustained growth and continued  low iion.  Periodic, possibly  large,
correctons  in equity  markets  affecting  one or several  emerging  markes are also  to be expected.
The probabfit  that these wil ental a contagious  reversal  of flows is modest-so  long as the
fundamentals  are robusL
Sustaining  piate  capital flows in the longer term requrs  an economic  and policy
environmet where developing  country  exports  continue  to grow rapidly. Creafi  the stable
enviromnen-where  foreign  direct  investment  in developing  counties is more profitable  than m
industial counties, to compena  for risk, is another  necessary  condition  for  sbilit  of a
large  part of these  flows.
Finally,  although  the questions  relaing to aWropriate  policy  res  to ineased  capital
-inflows  are outside  the scope.of  this note, their importance  should  not be underestimated.  As
noted earlier, borrowing  abroad by private agents involves  negative  exlities.  Further,
developmg  counties genrally have managed  exchange  rates as well as many mper  ions  in
the domestic  credit  markets. In view of these  considerations,  a sound  policy  fiamework,  on the
part of the recipiet country  regadig  the maimm  exposure  it should  carry  as well as the pace
and composition  of inflows, would  itself  be an important  determinant  of sustinability  of capital
flows.
29Appendix I
The relationship  between  sustainabk capital inflow,  the export  grow  rFate  and
the interest  rate
In this appendix  we will  apply  techniques  derived  in the literature  on sustainabiity
of government  deficits  .to  show that  the size of  sustainable capital inflows  depends
crucially  on the difference  between  the growth  rate of exports and the interest  rate.'
Let x, m, l, r  denote  exports,  imports,  foreign  liabilities,  and the return  on  foreip
liabilities  respectively.  Let  i  denote the change in  x  over tine  and i  the
percentage  change  in x,




where  (L/)  is the steady-state  liability  export ratio. The expression  on the left-hand  side
is the ALE as defined  in the text. Thus, the ALE is the steady-state  ratio. It is easy  to
;L±
show, under the assumption  that  - and  - are  constant, that the steady-state
-x  .x
equilibrium  is stable,  by noting  that ifL  )  then




implying  that  <x  (provided i  is positive) and  LA is therefore  dedining. The
x
converse  is  true if  <  <
The  steady-state  condition  (2)  can  be written  as
(m+rL-x)1IL .~~~~~~~~~~~  x
where the numerator  on the left-hand  side is the curr  account  deficit, L.  Moving  the
expression  to the right  hand side  and re:  this can  be written  as
(  -x, 1
(3m
(3)  (x)  )= =(3
A number  of  usefil  propositions  can  be derived  from (3) above.
Let us assume  thatL  > O, i.e. the country  is a borrower. Then  we  have  the following:
Proposition  I
In the steady-state  net transfers  (equal  to the non-interest  current  account  deficit)
are postive  if and  only  if I >  r, the export  growth  rate is higher  than  the  interest  rate.Proposition 2
Given a target liability/export  ratio, the size of net transfers  that the country  can
attract  indefinitely  is directly  proportional  to the difference  between  the export  growth  rate
and the interest  rate.
For example,  if (A)  i2,  is 10 percent  a year and r  is 8  percent  ayear, then
sustainable  net transfer, expressed  as a percent of exports, is 4 percent  a year.  IF,
however, i  acceerates  to 15 percent  a year, or, alternatively,  2  stays  at 10 percent,  r
fails  to 3 percent,  but the sustainable  net transfers  expressed  as a percent  of exports  rises
to 14 percent.
Proposiion 3
An increase  in the world  inflation  rate that is fhuy  included  (discounted)  in r  and
x  does not affect  the ALE. If the inflation  in  2  is greater than  the inflon  premium  in
r, the ALE falls  This can be interpreted  as an improvement  in the country's  terms of
trade.Appendix 2
Sustainability  Analysis  for Selected  Countries
This  appendix  presents  'country-at-a-glance' pagestor  B  selected  countries.  Each
country  page  provides  key  Indicators  for recent  yearm,  charts,  and  a brlet  exposition  of special









Sources: Bank  Economic  and  Socia!  Database  (BESD),
World  Debt  Tables  1993-1994,
March  1994  forecasts  used  in Global  Economic  Prospects,  1994,  and
IMF:  Intemational  Financial  Statistics  and  Research  Department.Argentina
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Key indicators
(annual  percentage  chagesa  ratad  sios)
1980-90  1992  1993  1994
Real  effectvey  exchange  rate  -3.0  5.1  9.6
GDP  growth  5.3  5.5  s.6  1.9
Investrnent/GD  P ratio (i()  24.5  15.3  19.7  1  9.0
Export growth (value) 11  14.9  10.8  5.7  8.2
Debt.export  ratio  2.1  1.9  1.9
Debt service  export  ratio (S)32.3  31.8  28A...
Currenvt  account  deficit  export  ratio (9S  l17.9  0.0  5.8  7.8
Asymptotic liability  export  rato I/  1.15  0.00  0.65  0.95
1  /Averages with four-year tags.
Turk-ey's  debt-service  ratio  (28*)  and  debu'export  ratio  (1.9)  arc  somnewhat  higli. but have  been  improving.  The  ALE
ratio has been very low,  but there has been a rcrnt  surge in its current account dericit. which is mask-ed  by the laps
utilized in the matio.  The  surge represented a spillover of fisca imbalance intio  the  external accounits.  The fiscal
deficit has also  been  the  cause of high real interest rates, wthich  have  resulted in very low investment ratios since the
late 1180s.  It appears that the governmnent  lack-s  political  will for serious fiscal  action  and  reformn  of state  owned
enterprises.  Disappointment with the tax reform bill introduced earlier in 1994  led lo an exchange rate turmoil, culmfi-
nating in a depreciation.  Turk-ey's  export miarkets  are mainily  int  Europe aknd,  so far, nmanagement  of exchange rates has
been able to kecep  export growth at a steady rate, despite comipetition  in)  textiles; this is likely to continUe. 7thu,
the critical issues for Turkey are fisca reformi  and the recovery of private investrkenL
Source: World Bank:  BESD. World DebtTables 1993-1994. and Marc;. 1994 forecasts  and I  MF.Venezuela
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